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Abstract
Secular stagnation is a tale of ageing economies permanently constrained in a below full-
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bined with a VAR for seven key macro-series augmented with demographics, we investigate
the link between the demographic transition and macroeconomic trends. We find that, while
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1 Introduction
Since the Great Recession, many of the world’s advanced economies have been experiencing ex-
tended periods of subpar growth, delaying the recovery and exacerbating some of the erstwhile
trends. Short and long-term interest rates have been on a downward path for almost thirty years.
Both have plunged into negative territory in the aftermath of the financial crisis and remained
there since then. In addition, low growth rates, below target inflation, dwindling unemployment
and sluggish productivity growth prompted concerns over a new normal characterised by a bind-
ing effective-lower bound (ELB) and persistent stagnation. These low-frequency phenomena
have several implications, constraining macro-policy, and particularly the scope of monetary
policy to respond to recessionary shocks. Hence, central banks were forced to thoroughly re-
consider their mandates, ensued the pursue of once dubbed unconventional monetary policies
and a call for further fiscal support to complement its decisions (Draghi, 2019).
Developed economies are as well undergoing a severe ageing process. In the last decades,
the age profile of these countries changed at a dramatically rapid pace, utterly shifting the de-
mographic structure. Steady gains in life expectancy, combined with a decay in infant mortality
and in fertility, caused population growth to shrink significantly, even becoming negative in
some cases (e.g. Japan), and a steeply rise in the number of old dependents (population aged
over 64). Furthermore, the aforementioned population variables should not suffer any deviation
in the foreseeable future from their ongoing trends. Changes on the age cohorts, as Hansen
(1939) suggested in his secular stagnation hypothesis which was recently revived by Summers
(2014), play an important structural role, acting as a key determinant of economic growth and
progress. Different agents decide differently, with their preferences being heterogeneously dis-
tributed given the age group to which each one belongs. According to their age, individuals
differ in their life-cycle consumption-saving decisions, labour supply, productivity level or con-
tribution to innovation. Therefore, demographics emerge as a natural possible explanation for
the current anemic economic environment.
Despite the increasing interest in studying precisely the outlets through which demograph-
ics affect economic activity, there is still a lack of econometric evidence, namely due to some
difficulties that arise when estimating the impact of the age structure. Cohorts are rather com-
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plex and highly collinear. Moreover, it is as well quite challenging to separate the boundaries
between demographics and other structural movements that might be the predominant forces
behind economic time series. Thus, it is common to impose strong restrictions and rely upon a
single variable to describe the demographic transition, specially the age dependency ratio (ratio
between the population aged over 64 years and the working population). The frequent usage of
this variable in the literature is motivated by its capability to best capture, under certain condi-
tions, movements in population growth and in longevity (Ferrero et al. (2017) and Carvalho et
al. (2016)).
Nevertheless, we argue that the demographic transition is a tale of two factors, not just
a single one. The age dependency ratio is a straightforward proportion measure that simply
illustrates which fraction of the population grew or faltered faster. As an example, between 1960
and 1980 in the United States, both working age and old age population increased significantly,
43% and 66% respectively. As a consequence, the latter outstripped the former, meaning a 2.4
percentage points surge in the age dependency ratio. To take just another example, in spite of
registering population dynamics similar to other developed countries, Japan has nowadays the
steepest slope in terms of age dependency ratio trends.
Given this setting, we propose a two-step estimation method that combines factor analysis
with a standard Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) to decompose the effect of the demographic
transition upon last decades’ macroeconomic dynamics in the United States, Japan and the
Euro Area. Using a Dynamic Factor Model (DFM), we start by extracting two factors from a
set of five demographic variables that best represent the shifting population trajectories in the
advanced world. Then, a VAR for a vector of seven key macro-variables is assembled, where we
incorporate the two “demographic factors” as well as the age dependency ratio in an alternative
specification, in order to assess the impact of demographics via these two distinct measures.
Finally, we compare the responses to a shock in each “demographic factor” with the ones for
the age dependency ratio.
Our results contribute to the literature by showing that a single variable is not sufficient to
describe the demographic transition. Responses obtained for the age dependency ratio specifica-
tion did not represent precisely recent dynamics and were on average smaller than the responses
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to an equivalent shock in our factors. However, our two factors jointly are able to explain vir-
tually the entire variability of the data (up to 95%). Results from the model augmented by the
unobservable factors indicate that the demographic transition has statistically significant im-
pacts on GDP, inflation, interest rate, savings, investment and hours worked. We also find that
the magnitude of demographic changes upon economies is large, having exerted deflationary
and contractionary forces based on data since 1970. Therefore, we provide further empirical
evidence of the link between the demographic outlet and the secular stagnation hypothesis.
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review on rel-
evant literature. Section 3 explains the theoretical framework employed. Section 4 describes the
dataset used, followed by Section 5 which provides the estimation results. Section 6 illustrates
our main results. Finally, Section 7 concludes this study.
2 Related Literature
The economic impact of demographics has always been a widely acknowledged and recurrent
topic in economic literature. Nonetheless, its role is not completely consensual, with many
economists diverging in through which channels and how it affects concretely economic dy-
namics. Interestingly, this debate was acutely common amid the very first economists centuries
ago, as it still is nowadays. Therefore, this analysis is of first-rate importance since it provides
granular quantitative evidence to the ongoing debate on the structural effects of demographics
in the developed world for the last five decades.
Adam Smith perceived population growth as simultaneously a consequence and a cause
of economic progress. Labour division, crucial element in Smith’s theory, generates greater
productivity, that in turn, bolsters growth by augmenting revenues, labour demand and wages.
Thus, the role of population growth was nothing but positive as it supported and created in a
sort of cycle, favourable conditions for expansion and prosperity. On the other hand, economists
such as Thomas Malthus or David Ricardo argued that flourishing population growth depressed
wages due to the labour market incapability to absorb the soaring labour supply. Additionally,
this surge would depress capital accumulation per capita, a crucial driver of the standard of life.
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These aforementioned effects would ultimately exert upward pressure on the limited natural
resources, rising rents and costs of cultivating, bound to reduce economies to subsistence.
Later, in the twentieth century, John Maynard Keynes, in a notorious lecture conducted
at the Eugenics Society, recognized the benefits of a relatively stable population and defended
that dwindling population growth implies more unemployment (Keynes, 1937). In the Keyne-
sian world, shrinking populations mean less aggregate demand and savings, thereby reducing
capital accumulation, hence generating higher unemployment levels. Although his view did not
materialize, he contradicted the consensus and warned that a declining population had indeed
numerous undesirable consequences. Less than two years after Lord Keynes’ speech, Alvin
Hansen, in his presidential address at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Associa-
tion, proposed the secular stagnation hypothesis. Secular Stagnation (Hansen, 1939) is a theory
of permanently constrained ageing economies, dragged by shortfalls in aggregate demand and
excess savings to a below full employment steady-state.
Summers (2014) resurrected this idea and suggested that we now live in a world where
the equilibrium real interest rate has declined significantly to a chronic zero-lower bound. Ac-
cording to his view, these remarkably low interest rates are the outcome of excess leveraging
associated with periods of unsustainable growth that masked some structural stagnation syn-
dromes in the pre-crisis era, namely diminishing populations and fast technological progress.
Other closely related contribution is the global saving glut characterized in Bernanke (2005),
who considered that US current account deficits in the beginning of the century were financed
by increasing desired saving in developing countries and partially in some ageing industrial
economies. In the long-run, however, advanced economies would fully return to its interna-
tional lender status due to their ageing populations, which because of the soaring number of
retirees and the limited domestic investment opportunities, will have higher saving propensi-
ties. Concerning secular stagnation, Eggertsson, Mehrotra, & Robbins (2019) were the first to
formalize this hypothesis through the development and calibration of several complex overlap-
ping generation models (OLG). Authors present quantitatively how the slowdown in population
growth and the increase in life expectancy alongside sluggish productivity growth have exerted
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downward pressure on the natural interest rate since 1970, causing it to range between -1.5 and
-2 percent in 2015.
The interest rate outlet is precisely the one that has been studied the most, given the undis-
putable importance that life-cycle saving and consumption decisions imply to its dynamics.
Carvalho et al. (2016) depict two main effects on the interest rate of a reduction in population
growth: higher capital per-worker leads to a reduction in the marginal product of capital hence
lowering the rate of interest; and given the steeply rise in the age dependency ratio (i.e. number
of retirees per workers), because this group has a smaller propensity to save, aggregate savings
are inferior, thus driving the interest rate up. Considering this setting, authors find that capi-
tal deepening outstrips the “consumption” effect with an overall 1.5 percentage points negative
outcome on the interest rate. In addition, Ferrero et al. (2017) produce various counterfactual
scenarios for the dependency ratio, arriving at similar conclusions. Others, such as Gagnon et
al. (2016), Cooley & Henriksen (2018) and Jones (2018) emphasize this same mechanism not
only for the interest rate, but also for economic growth and productivity.1 In contrast to these
findings, although Favero & Galasso (2015) show that aged economies tend to generate less
long-term growth, authors project real rates to revert to their historical mean by following an
ascending path in the forthcoming twenty years.
The transmission channels of demographic shifts, however, are far broader than the ones
we mentioned above. For instance, Aksoy et al. (2019) add the impact on innovation to their
study regarding the long-term impacts of changes in age cohorts, as Feyrer (2007) suggested.
Their analysis demonstrates significant effects for a panel of OECD countries on output, sav-
ings, investment, hours worked per capita and inflation. Beyond these results, they found a
negative relationship between the number of dependents and patents applications per capita, a
proxy for innovation, while the number of middle-aged workers affected it positively. Following
this technological intuition, Acemoglu & Restrepo (2017) explore the negative developments
in output since the nineties and associate them with burgeoning automation and the rise of ar-
tificial intelligence rather than with adverse age structure changes. Albeit not inferring any
causal connection between the two, they argue that countries experiencing faster ageing pro-
1See Gordon (2012) and Galor & Weil (2000) for further discussion on innovation, productivity and growth.
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cesses have adopted more rapidly solutions towards automation, such as implementing robots
in their industries. Alternatively, Basso & Jimeno (2020) and Eggertsson, Lancastre, & Sum-
mers (2019) re-examine Acemoglu & Restrepo (2017) evidence reaching opposite conclusions,
instead supporting secular stagnation.
3 Empirical Strategy
Dynamic Factor Models are largely used in economic literature being particularly popular in
macro-policy. Initially proposed in the seventies by Geweke (1977), the idea behind this ap-
proach is that fluctuations in the business cycle are driven by few unobservable latent factors
and idiosyncratic disturbances. Sargent & Sims (1977) seminal contribution showed that two
dynamic factors are able to explain a large proportion of the variation of fundamental macroe-
conomic variables, such as output and prices. More recently, Bernanke et al. (2005) influen-
tial work on monetary policy shocks departs from the conventional factor model analysis and
develops a factor-augmented VAR model (FAVAR), which includes both observable and un-
observable series. Nevertheless, so far DFMs have been studied mainly in a stationary frame-
work. Often in macroeconomics we aim to model non-stationary series. Since we are interested
in studying demography and its acutely persistent movements, we can not exclude the non-
stationary components of the series from our assessment. Hence, to incorporate the various
long-term trends that compose the demographic transition, we follow the methodology pro-
posed by Barigozzi et al. (2020), that performs factor estimations in a non-stationary setting, in
our first estimation step depicted in Section 3.1.
We propose a DFM in order to avoid heavy parametrization, given its appealing dimen-
sionality reduction logic, and also to capture any country specific unobservable dynamics that
otherwise would not have been explicitly considered.
Afterwards, we construct a VAR model to analyse empirically the effect of demographics
upon key macroeconomic variables. In Section 3.2, we will conduct two separate approaches:
first, we include factors extracted in the previous analysis, and second, an alternative specifica-
tion is built including the age dependency ratio.
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3.1 Non-Stationary Dynamic Factor Model
We undertake our factor analysis following essentially Barigozzi et al. (2020) methodology for
non-stationary DFMs, although with a slightly different notation.
Let 𝑋𝑡 represent a vector of 𝑛 non-stationary demographic series 𝑋𝑡 = (𝑋1𝑡 , ..., 𝑋𝑛𝑡)′ which is a
linear combination of latent common factors (𝐹𝑡) and idiosyncratic disturbances (𝑒𝑡), both can
be assumed to be at least I(1):
𝑋𝑡 = Λ𝐹𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 (1)
where 𝐹𝑡 is an 𝑟-dimensional column vector of unobserved factors, Λ is a 𝑛 × 𝑟 matrix of factor
loadings and 𝑒𝑡 = (𝑒1𝑡 , ..., 𝑒𝑛𝑡)′ is a vector with dimension 𝑛 that contains the idiosyncratic
components. Factors are driven by a VAR process, formally:
𝐹𝑡 = Φ1𝐹𝑡−1 + ... +Φ𝑘𝐹𝑡−𝑘 + [𝑡 (2)
equivalently, we can rewrite (2) in lag-polynomial notation as
Φ(𝐿)𝐹𝑡 = [𝑡 (3)
where Φ(𝐿) is a 𝑘 × 𝑟 matrix of lag polynomials and [𝑡 is an orthonormal 𝑟-dimensional vector
white noise, that is, [𝑡
𝑖.𝑖.𝑑.∼ (0, 𝐼𝑟). Moreover, it holds that loadings obtained for the model in
first differences i.e. Δ𝑋𝑡 = ΛΔ𝐹𝑡 + Δ𝑒𝑡 are exactly the same as those in equation (1) when the
model is estimated in levels.2 This equivalence allows us to overcome the difficulties posed
by the non-stationary framework without having to impose any heavy restrictions regarding the
model. As such, the unobserved factors can be extracted from the differentiated series (Δ𝑋𝑡)
by means of non-parametric averaging methods such as principal components. The usage of
this cross-sectional method cleans the influence of the idiosyncratic disturbances given that its
weighted averages will converge to zero, hence leaving only the variation associated with the
factors.
2See Barigozzi et al. (2020) for further details.
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The solution hinges upon retrieving the 𝑟 largest eigenvectors of the variance-covariance
matrix of 𝑋𝑡 subject to an arbitrary 𝑟 × 𝑟 matrix. This condition can be simply solved by
imposing the normalization 𝑛−1Λ′Λ = 𝐼𝑟 . Note that due to this restriction, factors entail no
possible interpretation nor economic reasoning, thus implying some difficulties that we will
address in Section 6. Once the loadings have been estimated, one can obtain the unobserved
components 𝐹𝑡 through the projection of 𝑋𝑡 onto the space spanned by the loadings at any
moment in time. It follows the least squares estimator of 𝐹𝑡 :
𝐹𝑡 = 𝑛
−1Λ̂′𝑋𝑡 (4)
Hence, after obtaining the loadings in first differences, one can easily get factor estimates in
levels given the estimator (4) by construction. Whilst other authors have come up with different
approaches, the common practice in modelling non-stationary DFMs consists precisely in first
differentiating 𝑋𝑡 so that stationary series are obtained, and then apply principal components on
Δ𝑋𝑡 as it ensures consistent estimates for Λ.
3.2 Unrestricted VAR
After estimating the factors, our second step is to incorporate them in a VAR model. VAR
models are the most widely used econometric tool in macroeconomics. This framework will
allow us to explore and identify the impact of exogenous demographic shocks, represented by
our factors 𝐹𝑡 , on a set of macro-variables. Within this context, consider a standard VAR(𝑝) as
our benchmark:
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐴1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ... + 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + ... + 𝛽𝑝𝐹𝑖𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (5)
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a set of macro-variables for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑝 is the number of lags included, 𝛼𝑖
is a time-invariant country specific intercept, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the reduced-form error term and 𝐹𝑖𝑡 are the
unobserved factors estimated in the previous section, which represent the demographic channels
as mentioned above.
Alternatively, we build an additional specification where we account for demographics
using the age dependency ratio instead. This alternative equation offers the possibility to estab-
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lish an empirical comparison between the results when the demographic transition is described
through our unobserved factors and the ones originated from the usage of the age dependency
ratio. We define:
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐴1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ... + 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜙1𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + ... + 𝜙𝑝𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝑝 + Y𝑖𝑡 (6)
where the unique difference to equation (5) is the inclusion of 𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑡 rather than 𝐹𝑖𝑡 , which stands
for the age dependency ratio in country 𝑖 at period 𝑡.
Our main interest here, however, is assessing how shocks in each “demographic factor” 𝐹𝑡
and in the age dependency ratio affect macro-variables 𝑦𝑡 . Therefore, our goal is to estimate the
impulse response functions (IRF) for 𝑦𝑡 to shocks in [𝑡 and Y𝑖𝑡 , that, given the standard invert-
ibility assumption in VAR literature, can be interpreted as linear combinations of the structural
shocks.
Once we are dealing with non-stationary factors, we can not exclude the possibility of
having cointegration relationships within our setting. Sims et al. (1990) proved that an un-
restricted VAR in levels is an equivalent representation to a Vector Error-Correction model
(VECM), yielding consistent parameters estimates, which in turn allow us to conduct impulse
response exercises. In this way, we do not need to address explicitly orders of cointegration
among our variables because the unrestricted VAR alone is able to capture any existing coin-
tegration relationships. The unique assumption we have to impose lies upon the stationarity of
the VAR residuals. If residuals are stationary, the equivalence between the two representations
holds and one can proceed without further assumptions.
4 Data
As previously mentioned, we are interested in decomposing the demographic transition. Given
that this is essentially a phenomenon that has been mostly affecting developed countries, we
focus on the effects for Japan, the country with the largest share of elderly dependents in the
world; the United States; the Euro Area as a block; as well as Portugal and Germany indi-
vidually, two of the “older” economies in Europe as to their number of old dependents. The
inclusion of the latter two countries aims to provide a more precise description of the individual
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demographic developments within the Eurozone and distinguish possible aggregate trends from
country specific dynamics in our sample.
In the first part of our empirical approach, where a factor analysis is performed, we use
five demographic variables that best describe the demographic transition. The series span from
1961 to 2018, combining annual data, collected from the Eurostat and the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators for the age dependency ratio, infant mortality, life-expectancy at birth,
fertility rate and population growth.3 Note that these population variables consider all residents
regardless of their legal status or citizenship, thus accounting for immigration. Additionally, by
using annual data rather than five-year averages, our representation permits a granular assess-
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Figure 1: Variables used to describe the Demographic Transition
The years covered in our dataset accompany the evolution of various social processes
that contributed to the current ageing trajectories. Children of the 1945 baby-boom started to
enter in the job market around the seventies. During this decade, economic and health con-
3See data Appendix for further details.
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ditions were immensely improved. For example, the steady gains in life expectancy illustrate
concretely those improvements. The abundance of labour supply supported by the entrance of
the baby-boom generation on economic maturity and by the higher labour-force participation of
women, combined with a decay in fertility rates, led to a sharp fall in the number of dependents,
ultimately favouring aggregate capital formation and growth. Moreover, Bussolo et al. (2015)
argue that dwindling child mortality was the igniting force behind the decline in fertility, later
reinforced by the remaining aforementioned developments. Together, these phenomena formed
a sort of “demographic snowball” effect that culminated in decades of waning populations and
swelling age dependency ratios (Figure 2). Our timespan will be able to capture all these move-




















1961 1969 1977 1985 1993 2001 2009 2017
JP EA US PT DE
Figure 2: Age Dependency Ratio
With respect to the VAR model, similarly to Aksoy et al. (2019) and Ferrero et al. (2017),
we have a vector of seven macro-variables, augmented by demographics as described in equa-
tions (5) and (6). For most of the sample, annual data from 1971 to 2018 is used, however, in
some cases, data availability forced us to consider a narrower time interval. The variables used
are: real GDP growth rate, investment growth rate, short-term interest rate, inflation rate, sav-
ings, average hours worked per worker, and finally, to control for global shocks, oil prices per
barrel.4 Apart from oil prices and short-term rates that were retrieved from the Federal Reserve
4All series that are not growth rates or shares were logarithm-transformed and then multiplied by one hundred.
See Table 3 in Appendix for further details.
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of St. Louis’ database and the Eurostat, respectively, all data for the VAR was extracted from
the OECD.
5 Estimation
Concerning the principal components analysis, we choose two common factors 𝑟 as our baseline
specification. Jointly, these factors account for up to 95% of the total data variance (Table 1).
As such, the selection of 𝑟 did not rely on any formal information criterion given that two
factors explained almost the entire data variability. Similarly to what Corsetti et al. (2018) do,
Figure 9 in Appendix compares the actual demographic data and the fitted series derived from
the extracted factors. Our intuition is reinforced by these predicted series as they closely trace
the majority of the movements in demographics. For some variables, the prediction is nearly
perfect.5 Moreover, considering that it takes two factors to capture the bulk of the variance in
the data, our reasoning regarding the age dependency is confirmed. If a single variable were
sufficient to explain the demographic transition, one would expect the first factor to account for
the largest proportion of the series variance.
Besides, Table 2 in Appendix presents the R-squared obtained from regressing the de-
mographic series on each factor. Despite the impossibility of a direct factor interpretation, this
table offers a decent correlation measure between factors and the concrete demographic vari-
ables behind them. In general, Factor 1 seems to be more related with life expectancy, infant
mortality and the age dependency ratio. Factor 2, on the other hand, is linked with population
growth in Germany and Portugal, with infant mortality in Japan and the Euro Area and with the
age dependency ratio in the US, Euro Area and Portugal. Note that, albeit both factors showed
substantially different correlations across variables and countries considered, individually they
are able to explain a sizeable fraction of the five variables. We will address factor interpretability
more in depth in Section 6.
Regarding the Vector Autoregressive model, it is important to note that we have annual
data at best from 1971 until 2018. In some cases, such as the Euro Area, data is only available
from 1997 onwards. Hence, our narrow time horizon will not allow the inclusion of several
5See Figure 9 in Appendix.
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lags. Notwithstanding this constraint, we analysed the optimal number of lags for our model
following Akaike, Hannan-Quinn and Bayes Information criterion. Across our panel of coun-
tries, criteria indicated for each of the two specifications either four or five lags. Thus, due to
sample time restrictions, we implement a model of order one for both specifications, similarly
to Aksoy et al. (2019) and Ferrero et al. (2017).
Additionally, in the VARs for the Eurozone at aggregate level, we excluded savings as
its first observation was in 2002. Because of this further observational reduction, our model
could not be properly estimated. In this way, we refrained from imposing such a heavy time
restriction and run our model without data for savings, which in turn, allowed us to use a wider
timespan.
Finally, we tested the stationarity of the residuals, using the Augmented-Dicky Fuller test.
All residuals are stationary at a 5% threshold level. Therefore, we can proceed without formally
testing for cointegration since the equivalent representation between a VAR and VECM holds.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Cumulative
Japan 0.5369 0.3132 0.8501
United States 0.6782 0.1714 0.8497
Euro Area 0.8188 0.1296 0.9485
Portugal 0.8827 0.05873 0.9414
Germany 0.4690 0.2442 0.7132
Table 1: Proportion of the variance explained by two factors
6 Results
In this section we present our empirical findings, starting with the benchmark VAR where de-
mographics were defined by means of our two estimated factors, and subsequently inspecting
the alternative specification for the age dependency ratio. Note that factors do not have any
straightforward meaning nor any possible interpretation. This issue, however, poses no difficul-
ties in terms of analysis. We overcome this interpretability constraint by scaling shocks in each
factor to the age dependency ratio. Then, we measure how our set of five demographic variables
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reacted individually to a shocks in the unobservable latent factors. These solutions allow us to
identify and relate factor variations to deviations in concrete variables, therefore providing a
clear and accurate measure to unravel demographic shocks in our baseline model. Due to the
persistence of demographics, cumulative IRFs were computed for every specification. Shocks
were defined to a one standard deviation, with its 68% confidence bands being obtained via
bootstrapping.
6.1 Benchmark VAR
We undertake our result description by presenting the impulse responses for Germany, Portugal,
Japan and the United States. Since the model for the Euro Area as a block was built without
savings, we present its main results separately in Figure 7. Our initial assessment focus is on
shocks in the first of the two extracted factors for five variables selected from the VAR.
Figure 3 shows the percentage responses to a one standard deviation shock in Factor 1
for the interest rate, inflation, GDP growth, savings and investment.6 At a first glance, shocks
generate heterogeneous reactions within our sample and no variable reacts contemporaneously.
Inspecting the interest rate outlet, overall cross-country effects are negative. Germany registers
at maximum a 1.5 percentage points drop, whereas Portugal denotes a neutral response in this
channel. Notably, Japan has the sharpest drop in inflation as well as in terms of GDP growth,
about 1.5 and 0.8 percentage points respectively. These results prove empirically how demo-
graphics have exerted deflationary and contractionary pressures upon the Japanese economy.
Apart from the rate of interest, Japan exhibits the largest falls in the considered set of
macro-variables, thus confirming its long-standing stagnant trends. It is noteworthy that when
compared with the United States and Germany, the Japanese responses largely exceeded the re-
actions of its peers among the world’s largest economies. Nevertheless, even though estimates
here depicted are asymmetrically distributed, primarily they illustrate the importance and in-
fluence of demographic shocks in the economy. Our estimation demonstrates statistically and
economically significant effects originated by these unexpected shocks in the age structure. Re-
garding savings and investment, there is a remarkably clear disparity between Germany, which
reveals after an initial decrease, a surge in these two variables, and the remaining countries, that
6See Figure 10 for all the impulse responses of average hours worked.
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display negative outcomes. In the Portuguese case, investment denotes a moderate response, not
differing very much from what occurs with respect to the interest rate. Average hours worked,
shown in Figure 10, decline in every country.
Finally, the first row of Figure 7 presents the main findings for the Euro Area. Here,
broadly speaking, responses are more irregular than the ones described above. Overall effects
are identical, we highlight particularly the significant movements caused upon GDP, investment
and interest rate. The unique difference lies on the rise of inflation, which in turn, tends to zero
after six periods.

































































































































































Figure 3: Percentage responses to a one standard deviation shock in Factor 1. Note: dashed
lines report the 68% bootstrap confidence bands.
Given this setting, we complete our reasoning following the responses of the demographic
variables resulting from the shock in Factor 1. Figure 4 contains the demographic reactions
associated to a shock in Factor 1. As we stressed before, this approach solves the interpretability
issue created by the inclusion of latent factors.
This figure features several surprising results, namely the neutrality of the age depen-
dency ratio in the United States and its downward trajectory for Japan. Furthermore, population
growth for the Euro Area, the United States and Portugal remains almost unchanged. Common
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to every country, however, is the steady increase in life expectancy and the decline in infant
mortality. These two indicators were very responsive to the shock, similarly to the estimates in
Table 2. Also, aside from the Euro Area, fertility rate also describes a dwindling response.
Results shown here decompose the demographic transition, thereby simulating the de-
mographic movements behind this factor. As can be observed, the substantial deflationary and
contractionary pressures outlined in Figure 3 are mostly related across our sample to steeply
rises in life expectancy and decaying infant mortality alongside fertility rates. Therefore, this
intuition is in accordance with recent literature on the gloomy consequences of the demographic
transition and supports the secular stagnation hypothesis. Besides, the age dependency ratio
exhibits as well significant upward responses, yet for Japan and the United States its role is
contrary to what we expected. Hence, this latter result reinforces our reasoning regarding it.
Notwithstanding its importance, some evident limitations prevent it to capture properly all the
population developments. If that was the scenario, one would expect to see promptly soaring
age dependency ratios in Figure 4 as a consequence of, for instance, an increase in longevity.


































































































































































































Figure 4: Demographic responses to a one standard deviation shock in Factor 1. Note: dashed
lines report the 68% bootstrap confidence bands.
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Moving on to the results of Factor 2, Figure 5 presents the responses to a shock in our
second “demographic” factor. Taking a closer look, once again there is a considerable degree of
heterogeneity among the sample. Denote as well the significant contrasts when comparing with
the reaction derived from Factor 1. Firstly, opposite trajectories depending on the factor that is
being shocked proves the idea that these demographic phenomena may provoke contradictory
forces in various economic outlets.








































































































































































Figure 5: Percentage responses to a one standard deviation shock in Factor 2. Note: dashed
lines report the 68% bootstrap confidence bands.
Concerning interest rates, the response is positive for the United States. Japan also ex-
hibits an increasing effect despite smaller, while Germany shows very little deviations, converg-
ing to zero after four periods. Portugal, on the other hand, outlines an enormous 3 percentage
points plunge into negative territory. Inflation decreases in the US and in Portugal, in spite of
the upward response in Germany, and curiously, in Japan. In terms of GDP growth, shocks
affect output positively in all countries except for Portugal, which does not suffer any consid-
erable variation. We emphasize particularly the maximum 0.5 percentage points response in
the United States. Looking at savings and investment, depicted in the final two columns, both
reveal an inverse reaction in comparison with the scenario where we analysed a shock in Factor
18
1. These variables indicate positive effects, with Portugal being the unique exception. Here, let
us underscore the large reactions in the United States and the stable path registered in Germany
after an initial surge. Lastly, hours worked for this case, increased in Germany and in the US,
denoting small deviations in the remaining countries after ten periods.




































































































































































































Figure 6: Demographic responses to a one standard deviation shock in Factor 2. Note: dashed
lines report the 68% bootstrap confidence bands.
Looking at the second row of Figure 7, once again, one can observe irregular responses
to a shock in Factor 2 for the Euro Area as a block, relatively to impulse responses assessed
above. On top of this, the rate of interest remains almost unchanged whilst inflation drops by
a maximum of 0.15 percentage points. With respect to GDP growth and investment, responses
are nearly indistinguishable. Nevertheless, the latter points to larger effects.
Analysing the demographic framework, Figure 6 illustrates variations associated with
shocks in Factor 2 for our set of five demographic variables. In this setting, the age dependency
ratio is more responsive, even though in the case of Germany the response is negative. Indeed,
results for Germany are quite surprising given that they show opposite signs to what one would
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expect to see. Identically unexpected estimates are obtained for life expectancy in the United
States as well as for infant mortality in our sample, excluding just the Euro Area case. Fertility
ratio decays in Portugal, Japan and in the United States and life expectancy increases for Por-
tugal, Japan and the Eurozone. In general, this factor seems to be mostly linked with a fall in
population growth and a surge in the age dependency ratio. Hence, from these results, we can
relate these population changes to expansionary economic trajectories.
It is noteworthy that the resulting effects from a shock in Factor 1 exceed the responses
caused by a shock in our second factor. Contractionary forces as a direct consequence of pop-
ulation shifts seem to prevail across our sample. This finding is in line with recent literature,
proving that the demographic transition contributed to a decline in the interest rate, inflation,
output growth and average hours worked. Only the United States appears to have avoided these
pressures, denoting combined increases in the interest rate, GDP growth and investment result-
ing from the two shocks. From our findings, we observe that shrinking active populations and
more old dependents due to higher longevity reflected into the negative responses on average
hours worked. The overall decline in investment and in the interest rate is also particularly
remarkable, since it is consistent with the lack of investment and the consequent lower natural
rate pointed by Hansen (1939) and more recently by Summers (2014). Savings, on the other
hand, do not evidence any clear saving glut as Bernanke (2005) and Summers (2014) suggested.
Nevertheless, our estimates are aligned with Aksoy et al. (2019) projected long-term slump in
savings. In addition, some of these changes appear to be modestly correlated with the age de-
pendency ratio, therefore sustaining our reasoning that long-standing demographic trends are a
conjunction of several social developments.
As a validation of this method, and given that countries such as Germany and Portugal
experienced extraordinary events during the years covered in our sample that might have in-
ducted structural breaks (e.g. German reunification, adherence of the Euro etc.), we included
time dummies in our model to address for endogeneity concerns. This robustness check reas-
sured the validity of our results. Responses for Germany exhibited a slight decrease. Contrarily,
in Portugal the effects were amplified.
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Additionally, we run the model including just the first factor and then conduct the respec-
tive impulse responses to assess whether this factor alone would describe adequately the link
between demographics and macroeconomic trends. Responses yielded were acutely identical
as those in Figure 3, only their magnitude revealed minor changes.












































































































Figure 7: Percentage Responses for the Euro Area to a one standard deviation shock in Factor
1, Factor 2 and in the age dependency ratio. Note: dashed lines report the 68% bootstrap
confidence bands.
6.2 Alternative Specification: Age Dependency Ratio
At last, we analyse our second specification where the age dependency was introduced to de-
scribe the demographic transition rather than our unobservable factors. We point out that if this
variable were the silver bullet to represent recent population developments, we would expect it
to illustrate precisely current economic dynamics.
Figure 8 contains the impulse response functions for the same variables assessed before,
but now to a shock in the age dependency ratio. Responses feature high levels of cross-country
heterogeneity. Note as well that for the Euro Area (third row of Figure 7) the reactions are
smoother and more stable than in the earlier analysis. The reaction upon the interest rate is
negative in all countries. Looking at inflation, Germany and Japan show positive responses,
though in the case of the latter, the effect was quite modest. GDP reflects minor changes in the
United States and Portugal, whilst Germany and Japan describe descending paths. Similarly,
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investment demonstrates rather identical movements as GDP. Regarding hours worked (Figure
10), the United States and Germany are the only two exceptions to a general fall in this labour
market indicator. Lastly, savings rise significantly in Germany and fall in the rest of the sample.























































































































































Figure 8: Percentage responses to a one standard deviation shock in the Age Dependency Ratio.
Note: dashed lines report the 68% bootstrap confidence bands.
In order to compare these responses with those derived from our factors, we run our
benchmark model again and obtain the impulse responses normalised by the size of the shock in
the age dependency ratio, that is, one standard deviation as depicted in Figure 8. Since shocks
will be equivalent, this solution allows us to relate explicitly age dependency ratio responses
implied by a shock in our factors with the ones estimated for the dependency ratio specification,
thus permitting a clear interpretation between the two measures. To do so, we selected the factor
most correlated with the age dependency ratio for each country,7 and then estimate its responses
considering the size of interest.
Figure 11 and 12 in Appendix illustrate the responses implied by shock in the selected
factor, equivalent to the shock in the age dependency ratio model (i.e. one standard devia-
7We chose Factor 1 for every country apart from the US, where we used Factor 2 due to the implicit neutral
age dependency ratio response of Factor 1 shown in Figure 4.
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tion). Demographic changes here projected are very identical, but smaller when compared with
the results from our first specification. More importantly, we note that these effects did not
match the responses for the age dependency ratio VAR, shown in Figure 8. For instance, when
the response in the age dependency ratio associated with a factor shock has the same size as
when we shock the dependency ratio alone, interest rate and GDP in Japan dropped respec-
tively by a maximum of 1 and 0.8 percentage points for the first scenario. Whereas on the
second, responses for both variables fell just 0.12 percentage points. Identical gaps between
the two measures were estimated for the remaining countries and variables. As stressed above,
responses are substantially different in terms of magnitude and sign from the ones estimated in
the model for the age dependency ratio. We quantified the average difference between the these
two scenarios for our sample in Table 4 in Appendix. Broadly speaking, reactions to factor
shocks outstripped on average the responses in the age dependency ratio case, ranging from
-0.13 to 0.64 percentage points.
With that being said, the age dependency seems to offer an insufficient measure for the
demographic transition. Consequently, our intuition as well as our previous findings for the
baseline VAR are validated by these results. Although one variable is not enough to describe
recent population trends, our analysis shows that two variables, more specifically the two esti-
mated unobservable components, are able to quantify and characterize much more appropriately
the effects of the demographic transition.
7 Conclusion
The aftermath of the Great Recession has been unanimously anemic in the advanced world.
The crisis itself only aggravated some previous chronic trends that were already dragging de-
veloped economies towards a secular stagnation steady-state, characterised by subpar output
growth, binding effective-lower bound and persistent below target inflation. Even though this
“new normal” is still positive, it carries unmitigated undesirable implications, namely for mon-
etary policy. At the same time, these economies are undergoing a severe five-decade long
demographic transition. Given the importance of the age structure in determining life-cycle
consumption-saving decisions, demographics emerge as a natural possible explanation for the
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slowdown in growth. This outlet was particularly underlined in Hansen’s seminal hypothesis
and whereas other structural trends may be difficult to forecast, demographic developments are
acutely persistent, hence easily predictable.
In spite of this wide recognition, the role of demographics upon economic progress re-
mains unclear. Over the last few years, there has been a remarkable increasing interest and
effort in studying accurately the transmission channels of population shifts, however, empirical
evidence is still less compelling. Moreover, it is common to rely on a single measure to describe
changes in age cohorts, while these phenomena are a combination of various asymmetric de-
velopments. Thus, our aim was to provide further evidence and decompose the outlets through
which demographics might contribute to secular stagnation.
Our results contribute to the literature by demonstrating that there are necessary two fac-
tors to explain virtually the entire variance of the demographic data, therefore proving that a
single variable is not sufficient to trace recent demographic movements. Among our findings,
we emphasize that the demographic transition has significant impacts upon GDP, inflation, in-
terest rate, savings, investment and hours worked across our entire sample. Moreover, based on
data since the seventies, we show that demographic changes have exerted strong deflationary
and contractionary forces in Japan, Euro Area, Portugal and Germany. These findings support
empirically the secular stagnation hypothesis and are consistent with recent literature on the
influence of ageing on long-run growth. Only the United States seems to have avoided large
overall depressing effects. This conclusion is not surprising because of the panel of countries
analysed, the US were and are expected to be the least affected by ageing and tumbling popula-
tion growth. Results obtained are robust to both global shocks and various time effects, namely
historical events that could have constituted a source of endogeneity to our model.
To conclude, we would like to stress the necessity for further research regarding the effects
of ageing. Our results offer an entirely different perspective for assessing the contribution of
demographics to macroeconomic trends. Hence, our analysis can be widely applied in future
research to adequately inspect demographic outlets. Particularly, we consider that the influence
of ageing on technological progress and on labour markets should be precisely decomposed in
order to better understand how demographics affect economic trajectories. In addition, it would
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be interesting to investigate how different economic theories on the impact of population shifts
relate to our two factors. This analysis is of utmost importance given that these trends are not
easily reverted. Beyond constraining our capacity to respond to future cyclical downturns and
ensure macroeconomic stabilization, demographic changes pose a serious structural conundrum
for policymakers, putting at stake the sustainability of fiscal policy decisions, thus leaving a
heavy burden for future generations.
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Figure 9: Factors explanatory power. Comparison between the demographic variables (black
lines) and the predicted series (red lines) fitted from the two extracted factors for our sample.
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Factor Interpretation (R-squared)
Germany Portugal Japan United States Euro Area
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2
Age Dependency Ratio 0.61 0.02 0.77 0.52 0.85 0.00 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.98
Fertility Rate 0.34 0.05 0.94 0.39 0.76 0.15 0.54 0.27 0.85 0.34
Life Expectancy 0.96 0.00 0.92 0.49 0.99 0.20 0.95 0.29 0.94 0.86
Population Growth 0.02 0.99 0.00 0.68 0.75 0.14 0.41 0.38 0.60 0.27
Infant Mortality 0.92 0.00 0.99 0.27 0.85 0.48 0.98 0.28 0.98 0.55
Table 2: R2 retrieved from the linear regression of the demographic series on each factor.
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Dataset
This section of the Appendix contains a complete and detailed description of the dataset used.
All series are annual and span from 1961 to 2018. Demographic data for Germany starts in
1968. Data used in the VAR for the United States and the Euro Area is respectively available





5-First difference of logarithm
Note: logarithmized series were multiplied by one hundred.
Description Source Transformation Start End
Demographic Variables
Age Dependency Ratio, % of working age population World Bank 1 1961 2018
Fertility Rate, births per woman World Bank 1 1961 2018
Life Expectancy at Birth, number of years World Bank 1 1961 2018
Population Growth, % change at annual rate World Bank 1 1961 2018
Infant Mortality, number per 1,000 live births World Bank & Eurostat 1 1961 2018
Macroeconomic Variables
Investment (Gross Fixed Capital Formation), % annual growth rate OECD 1 1971 2018
Savings, % of GDP OECD 1 1971 2018
Hours Worked per Worker, annual average OECD 4 1971 2018
GDP at market prices (2015=100), annual growth rate OECD 1 1971 2018
Inflation (CPI), % annual change OECD 1 1971 2018
Nominal Short-Term interest rate % annual change Eurostat 1 1971 2018
Oil Price (WTI), average annual price per barrel FRED 4 1971 2018
Table 3: Data description.
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Impulse Responses for Average Hours Worked



























































































































































Figure 10: Percentage responses in the average annual hours worked per worker to a one stan-
dard deviation shock. Note: dashed lines report the 68% bootstrap confidence bands.






































































































































































































Figure 11: Percentage responses normalised by the size of the age dependency ratio shock.
Note: dashed lines report the 68% bootstrap confidence bands.

























































Figure 12: Percentage responses normalised by the size of the age dependency ratio shock for
the Euro Area. Note: dashed lines report the 68% bootstrap confidence bands.
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Variable Germany Portugal Japan US Euro Area
Interest rate 0.251 -0.133 0.278 0.161 0.042
Inflation 0.153 0.004 0.641 -0.099 0.035
GDP Growth -0.073 0.002 0.273 0.131 0.081
Savings -0.101 0.113 0.334 0.164 —
Hours Worked 0.049 0.368 0.500 0.108 0.084
Investment -0.054 -0.080 0.375 0.244 0.193
Table 4: Average absolute difference between an equivalent shock in one of our factors and the
age dependency ratio.
Note: we chose Factor 1 for every country apart from the US, where we used Factor 2 due to
the implicit neutral dependency ratio response of Factor 1 shown in Figure 4.
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